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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the use of DLLP in the banking sector of Pakistan.  First, the study 
identifies the factors affecting the use of DLLP in Islamic banks of Pakistan. Secondly, the study also tries to 
examine the difference between the use of discretion in Islamic and conventional banks. The study used secondary 
data collection method and applied regression technique for analysis. The study provide evidence that all the 
factors including CAR, bank size and profitability effect the use of DLLP in Islamic banks except LD and EBTP. 
The study also found that conventional banks are more involved in DLLP compared with Islamic banks. The 
reason may be that Islamic banks in Pakistan work under Sharia supervisory board and avoid the practices of 
earnings management. The sharia principled are based on fairness, justice, and equal chances of profit and loss. 
This study may be helpful for regulators who can make policies for financial statements to be more transparent. 
This study can also be useful for investors to get to know how much discretion banks has made on the main 
accounting item. 
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1. Introduction 
The internal and external stakeholders depend heavily on the reliability of annual reports of a business. The 
financial reports lead to the formation of crucial decision makings like capital raising and investment (Ghazali, 
Shafie & Sanusi, 2015). These reports work just like a mirror to all stakeholders because they used it for checking 
the financial performance of a bank. Therefore, these reports must be reliable not only for stakeholders but also 
for the general public (Haat, Rahman & Mahenthiran, 2008). (Mohammady, 2012) stated that the most important 
part of annual reports is income statement because the capital market relies on it. However, the transparency of 
financial reports depends mainly on management, auditors and directors. Their positive behavior would ultimately 
help in generating these reports valid (Haat et al. 2008). 
Managers perform discretionary management of their earning either for the sake of their personal benefits or 
under the pressure of higher management. In these practices managers hide the true value of the business from 
investors (Alexander & Hengky, 2017). (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) indicated that change in actual values of 
financial figures by managers to deceive a few partners is called earning management. As financial reports 
represent the financial health of a business so, the investors make major decisions based on them. If the reporting 
process involves the practices of earnings management, ultimately it will produce ambiguous financial statements. 
Which could affect the decision making process of investors negatively.   
Different research studies found that banks are more involved in these practices. Banks managers are 
encouraged to make changes in financial statements and ambiguously show their profit. Loan loss provision(LLP) 
is the instrument that banks used for making changes in financial statements (Mohammady, 2012; Ghazali et al. 
2015). Researchers identify that Islamic banks are the one which avoids being the part of (Earning Management) 
EM practices (Taktak et al., 2010a). While at the same time there are some studies providing evidence of Islamic 
banks using LLP to smooth their earnings (Hung & Tran, 2018).  Besides the evidence of different studies, the 
discretionary component of this variable in Pakistan is still missing.  
Following (Othman & Mersni, 2014) this study is using discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) as a 
component to measure the practices of earning management. The purpose of this study is to identify the factors 
which effect the use of DLLP in Islamic banks of Pakistan. The second purpose is to examine the difference in the 
use of discretion between Islamic banks and conventional banks? In developing countries like Pakistan, banks 
considered to play a key role for the efficient distribution of resources. But, this favorable result could only be 
grasped if banks are associated with unfair activities. Earnings manipulation and centralization of powers are part 
of these activities. On the other hand, the responsibility of a bank should be the accurate disclosure of their assets, 
wealth and liabilities (Sheikh & Quresshi, 2017). 
Literature suggests that fair and accurate information on financial statements should be the responsibility of 
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a bank (Mohammady, 2012). These financial reports are used for checking the financial performance of banks 
(Haat, Rahman & Mahenthiran, 2008). Therefore, the quality of these reports must be reliable. However, as the 
financial reports are the sensitive document for determining the bank’s most important component like profit. 
Managers have been recognized to utilize discretion usually allowed by the prevailing accounting standards 
(Ashfaq & saeed, 2017). Available discretionary measures make the manipulation easy for managers. They used 
those measures for hiding the actual facts and yield the desired accounting numbers for stakeholders and investors 
(Kumari & Pattanayak, 2017). If annual reports are the representation of the bank performance and managers still 
involve in making changes intentionally then it is clear that identification of main reasons behind such practices is 
still missing. Therefore, this study will examine the factors which effect the use of DLLP in Islamic banks of 
Pakistan. Moreover, the study will also examine the difference in the use of DLLP between Islamic banks and 
conventional banks. 
The study will be useful for investors, regulators and auditors. This study gives awareness to regulators that 
which factors banks are using for DLLP and how can strong policies alleviate them. This study can also be useful 
for investors to get to know how much discretion banks has made on the main accounting item. Moreover, this 
study can also help auditors by giving information on which type of policies banks adopt for making these practices.  
 
2.0 Theoretical and Literature Review 
There is not a single definition of earnings management(EM) on which researchers could agree upon. So all type 
of activities which leads to changes in the accounting item of financial statements could be categorized as earning 
management except financial reporting fraud (Alexander & Hengky, 2017). Any modification that firm makes in 
reporting the financial performance of a business to mislead its users is called EM (Schipper, 1989). The purpose 
includes misdirecting company stakeholders by doing manager's own judgment at the time of financial statements 
composition (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). According to (Kumari & Pattanayak, 2017) these practices of EM have put 
a question on the integrity of published accounting items. Research shows that banks are also part of these practices.  
Earning management can be of two types discretionary or real earning management. Many research studies 
provide evidence that companies and banks are involved in changing their earnings (Shen & Chih, 2005; Wang, 
Chen, Lee & Shyu, 2012). This issue is more sensitive in banks because of the importance of banks for economic 
development. Banks play a key role in the growth and stability of a country (Hamdi & Zarai, 2012). A manipulation 
in one sector can ultimately disturb the whole economy similarly likely to the financial depression which also 
originated from banks. Accurate and detailed information is missing between investors and bank managers. As the 
bank shows the wrong information to the shareholders. The investor makes future perdition about bank 
performance based on inaccurate data which can affect the stability of a bank (Palia and Porter, 2007).  
The study relates to agency theory where bank managers do not care about investors. They always try to put 
their personal benefits first and then think about someone else concern. Considering these points in mind they 
make those strategies and plans which will help them to gain a personal advantage. These agency problems could 
be solved if investors have the authority to monitor and control the manager's behavior. The identification of EM 
practices is easy in manufacturing firm but difficult in banks (Macey & Hara, 2003).  
A large body of research provides evidence for the presence of EM practices in banks and the factors which 
can affect the use of DLLP. After that, researchers try to find out the difference in the use of DLLP if the nature 
of the bank changed like public banks, private banks, conventional as well as Islamic banks.  Islamic banks run 
under different structures and goals, they focus on the equal chance of profit as well as losses. The Islamic banks 
in Pakistan work under Sharia principles and avoid the practices of earnings management. The sharia principled 
are based on fairness, justice and the balance between the chances of profit and loss (Octavia & Florentina, 2018).  
Literature has many research studies on conventional banks but the studies on Islamic banks provide mixed 
results. Islamic banks have Shariah Supervisory Boards for monitoring the financial products according to the 
compliance of shariah principals. So these banks are less likely to involve in making ambiguous accounting 
decisions (Quttainah, 2011). On the other hand, many studies go against the arguments of Islamic principles and 
declared that both banks behave similarly. Islamic banks act in the same way as conventional banks do. Both banks 
involve in DLLP for producing favorable outcomes (Octavia & Florentina, 2018; Zoubi & Al-Khazali, 2007).   
 
2.1 Factors affecting the DLLP 
2.1.1 Earning Management 
The relationship between EM and DLLP is significantly positive. When accounting earnings are high enough, 
managers are more tend to recognize provision. The more earning variability a bank has, will increase the chances 
of a bank manager to involve in smoothing earning through LLP (Pinho and Martins, 2009, Othman, 2014). LLP 
helps managers to smooth their earnings instead of showing segregated part of their income over time. Literature 
identifies that the most useful method for the identification of EM practices is earning before tax and provision. 
This relationship is directly proportional to each other. If the ratio of EBTP is low, then the mangers use discretion 
to decrease the LLP. If the ratio of EBTP is high, then the manager uses discretion in increasing the LLP. Therefore, 
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the relationship is positive between DLLP and EBTP.  
2.1.2 Capital Management 
Another most important factor is capital management which is known as Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR). 
Empirical findings of previous studies show that the relationship is either positive and negative between DLLP 
and CAR. Some studies reveal that banks with low capital ratio try to use discretion to present low DLLP (Kim & 
Kross, 1998). All those banks enrich with capital can get the relaxation on strict monitoring by regulatory agencies 
(Taktak et al., 2010b).  So they can get the benefit of using discretion in making ambiguous earnings and capital. 
Which dictates that there is a negative relationship between DLLP and CAR in Islamic banks.  
2.1.3 Loan to Deposit Ratio 
Studies prove that there is a negative relationship between earnings management and LD ratio. This ratio has been 
used for external finance proxy (Zoubi & Al-Khazali, 2007). If the LD ratio is high, it depicts that banks have 
more loans then deposit. Which ultimately enforce managers to attract more customer’s deposit and banks reports 
low LD ratio. Therefore, the association between these variables is significantly negative.  
2.1.4 Bank Size 
From all the factors affecting DLLP, the bank size is considered as the most important one. This factor has a strong 
impact on the earnings management behavior of managers. Studies show that if the size of the bank is large, then 
there is a strong indication of high DLLP. So there is a positive relationship between bank size and DLLP (Taktak 
et al., 2010b; Quttainah, 2011).  
2.1.5 Profitability 
Since profitability is the most critical component of any bank so there in DLLP literature. (Gunawan et al., 2015) 
stated that profitability is used as a measure to check the ability of a bank in making profit. This direct relationship 
dictates that the more the profit of a bank the higher will be the LLP. Managers try to make discretionary changes 
in profitability for showing a good picture of their business (Alexander & Hengky, 2017).  
 
3.0 Methdology 
Pakistan banks are used as population in this study. Banks have great importance and role in gowth and economic 
development of a country. The sample consists of 5 commercial banks and 5 Islamic banks of Pakistan. Data is 
collected from the annual reports of banks available on their official websites. The period of the study is from 2010 
to 2019. The study employs the panel regression technique for the estimation of this model. Data is a balanced 
panel so a balanced panel data technique has been applied.  
3.1.1 Earning Management 
The main accrual of the banking sector is LLP. This substitute is further splited into two parts: Discretionary and 
non-discretionary accruals. 
DLLP represents that part of LLP on which managers make manipulation. Whereas NDLLP consist of that part 
which is out of control of bank managers like bad debts, default risk etc (Beaver & Engle 1996). So, the main 
model is given below: 
LLP = Non-discretionary LLP + Discretionary LLP 
Since the NDLLP cannot be observed directly so the equation of LLP is estimated by following (Othman & Mersni, 
2014) approach.   
LLP = β0 + β1 NPL + β2 ΔNPL + β3 ΔTL + ε……..(1) 
Where: LLP is Loan loss provision, NPL equal to non-performing loan’s opening balance, ΔNPL is the change in 
the value of non-performing loans and ΔTL is computed by change in the value of total loan. 
Table 1: Regression Results from Equation 1 
Variables β t-value p-value 
C 4.4501 0.4226 0.0000*** 
NPL 0.8406 30.4541 0.0000*** 
ΔNPL 0.9355 7.0980 0.0000*** 
ΔTL 0.0376 2.0114 0.1017* 
F-Statistics 402.5223 --- 0.0000*** 
R2 0.9335 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate level of significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
First of all, we estimate equation one and the results are presented in table 1. The Hausman specification test 
has been employed to select between fixed or random effect model. Hausman test show siginificant statistics, 
so we move towards fixed effect model. The value of R2 is 0.9335 which shows highest explanatory power. 
Now, we will estimate the NDLLP using the estimated 
^
0, 
^
1, 
^
2 and 
^
3 from equation 1.  
NDLLP = 
^
0 + 
^
1 NPL + 
^
2 ΔNPL + 
^
3 ΔTL……..(2) 
Finally, the DLLP is calculated by taking the difference between total LLP and estimated NDLLP. 
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DLLP = LLP – [
^
0 + 
^
1 NPL + 
^
2 ΔNPL + 
^
3 ΔTL]……..(3) 
3.1.2 Regression Model 
In regression model we use LLP as dependent variable and find the relationship between all those factors which 
can effect DLLP. 
DLLP = β0 + β1 EBTP + β2 CAR + β3 LD + β4SIZE + β5ROA + Type + ε……..(4) 
Where DLLP is discretionary loan loss provision, EBTP is calculated by earnings before taxes and provisions 
deflated by total assets for bank i at the year t, CAR is equal to capital adequacy ratio for bank i at the year t, 
measured by average total equity over average total assets, Size computed as bank size for bank i at the year t, 
expressed as natural log of asset, ROA is Profit after tax/ Total assets, Type is a dummy variable.  
 
4.0 Results and Discussion 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the results.  Panel A displays the descriptive statistics of conventional 
banks. The average value of ΔNPL is 4.37 ranging from 0.00 to 7.43, which can deviate with slightly higher units 
2.97. The average value of DLLP is 7.15 with maximum value of 8.017 and minimum 5.02, and the variation of 
mean is 0.83 units. The natural log of assets (size) state average value with 19.90 and its maximum value is 21.71 
and minimum value is 15.80 units.  
Similarly, panel B states the descriptive statistics for Islamic banks. The variable LLP represents the average 
value 6.17 with standard deviation of 0.83 units. The average value of ΔTL of Islamic banks are 6.7 with plus 
minus 1.23 units of mean. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Particular ΔNPL ΔTL CAR DLLP EBTP LD LLP NPL ROA SIZE 
Panel A: Conventional Banks 
 Mean 4.3693 5.9754 0.0924 7.1525 0.0522 0.5761 7.1525 6.9714 0.0137 19.909 
 Median 5.7479 7.1674 0.0854 7.2956 0.0498 0.5536 7.2956 7.3383 0.0156 20.539 
 Maximum 7.4323 8.2112 0.1802 8.0713 0.0968 0.8264 8.0713 8.1081 0.0346 21.710 
 Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0543 5.0232 0.0063 0.3976 5.0233 4.7517 -0.0266 15.803 
 Std. Dev. 2.9758 2.7498 0.0273 0.8375 0.0149 0.1230 0.8375 1.0446 0.0113 1.7397 
Panel B: Islamic Banks 
 Mean 3.7145 6.7541 0.1248 6.1713 0.0092 0.5724 6.1713 6.2639 0.0065 18.240 
 Median 5.3511 6.8587 0.0837 6.2879 0.0064 0.5397 6.2879 6.4061 0.0057 18.191 
 Maximum 7.1649 8.0378 0.3252 7.0780 0.0531 0.8137 7.0780 7.1954 0.1199 20.482 
 Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0465 4.0484 -0.0404 0.3780 4.0484 4.1315 -0.0285 16.621 
 Std. Dev. 2.8072 1.2330 0.0865 0.6260 0.0199 0.1281 0.6260 0.6761 0.0209 1.0087 
The table 3 contains the correlation metrix results, the correlation between independent variables. The first 
part shows the correlation of variables in conventional banks and second part states the relationship in islamic 
banks. The highest coefficient of correlation is 0.57 between EBTP and CAR, showing that multicollinearity does 
not affect the data. In the same vein the Islamic banks panel B is showing the highest coefficient of correlation 
between EBTP and ROA, ensuring that data is save from multicollinearity problem. 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: Conventional Banks 
Variables EBTP CAR LD SIZE ROA 
EBTP 1.0000     
CAR 0.5728 1.0000    
LD 0.1790 0.2560 1.0000   
SIZE -0.0589 -0.5280 -0.2089 1.0000  
ROA 0.4578 0.0134 -0.0128 0.5516 1.0000 
Panel B: Islamic Banks 
Variables EBTP CAR LD SIZE ROA 
EBTP  1.0000     
CAR  0.0393  1.0000    
LD -0.0865  0.4448  1.0000   
SIZE  0.4739 -0.5561 -0.3180  1.0000  
ROA  0.5278  0.3184  0.2095  0.1029  1.0000 
This table 4 explain the ANOVA results for comparing the variables of islamic and conventional. The 
conventional banks have 7.15 LLP and Islamic banks have 6.17, which is showing that islamic banks have low 
LLP ratio. The NPL are 6.97 and 6.26 for conventional as well as islamic banks. The results indicate that islamic 
banks have less NPL as compared to conventional banks. The ratio of EBTP and CAR are lower in islamic banks 
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and higher in conventional banks. Moreover, the ratio of DLLP is high in case of conventional banks and low for 
islamic banks. We conclude on the results that islamic banks are less involved in DLLP and conventional banks 
are more intending to use this discretion.  
Table 4: Analysis of ANOVA 
Variables Mean Mean 
Difference 
t-value p-value 
Conventional Islamic 
LLP 7.1526 6.1713 0.9812 6.1575 0.0000*** 
NPL 6.9715 6.2640 0.7075 3.7051 0.0000*** 
ΔNPL 4.3694 3.7145 0.6548 1.0636 0.2903 
ΔTL 5.9754 6.7542 -0.7787 -1.6611 0.1002* 
EBTP 0.0522 0.0092 0.0429 11.6941 0.0000*** 
CAR 0.9242 0.1249 -0.0324 -2.5034 0.0141*** 
LD 0.5761 0.5725 0.0265 0.1371 0.8921 
SIZE 19.9098 18.2407 1.6690 5.3834 0.0000*** 
ROA 0.0137 0.0066 0.0071 2.0647 0.0418** 
DLLP 7.1526 6.1713 0.9812 6.1584 0.0000*** 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate level of significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The main results of our regression model are given in Table 5. The value of EBTP is -0.6 stating that an 
average one-unit increase in EBTP leads to -0.6 units decrease in the value of DLLP and statistically significant. 
The CAR beta is positive and significant and 1% level of significance. However, the LD have negative relationship 
with DLLP at -0.01, but insignificant showing that the loan to deposit ration have no impact on discretion used by 
managers. Similar results found in ROA which is also representing no impact on DLLP.  As we can see in the 
results of ANOVA table there is clear difference between the use of DLLP by conventional and Islamic banks. 
Now in this table of regression the variable TYPE is just proving our hypothesis with 1% level of significance. 
The relationship between TYPE and DLLP is statistically significant means that if banks are conventional then 
they are more involved in making discretion compared with Islamic banks similarly likely (Quttainah, 2011). The 
explanatory power of independent variables is 63% which is quite strong.  
Table 5: Regression Results from Equation 4 
Variables β t-value p-value 
C -0.6978 -6.0418 0.0000*** 
EBTP -0.2231 -1.6372 0.1053* 
CAR 0.2512 2.7623 0.0070*** 
LD -0.0139 -0.1972 0.8441 
SIZE 0.0811 8.0234 0.0000*** 
ROA -0.1443 -1.4433 0.1526 
TYPE -0.4104 -3.3067 0.0013*** 
F-Statistics 24.4991 --- 0.0000*** 
R2 0.6391 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate level of significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
The purpose of the study is to carefully analyze all those factors which can affect the use of DLLP in Islamic banks. 
Those factors include EBTP, CAR, LD ratio, bank size and profitability. The results declare that these factors have 
a significant impact on DLLP except LD ratio and EBTP. Secondly we also try to examine the change in the use 
of DLLP in Islamic and conventional banks. Our study provides evidence that Islamic banks are reluctant in the 
use of discretion, compared with conventional banks. The results go similar with (Quttainah, 2011) who declared 
that religion have an impact on managers accounting decision making process. 
Future researchers can take more samples and include investment banks and development banks in their 
samples. Further they can make comparisons between financial and non-financial institutions. 
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